Tuesday, January 21, 2025

While dealing with second appeal filed under Order XLI r/w Section 100 CPC, High Court cannot grant ad interim order without framing substantial question of law: Supreme Court

Supreme Court passed judgment on 17.01.2025 in the matter of U. Sudheera & Others vs. C. Yashoda & Others to reaffirm that judicial principle that while dealing with a second appeal filed under Order XLI r/w Section 100 CPC, High Court cannot grant ad interim order without framing substantial question of law.

The facts before the Supreme Court were that the suit filed by the Respondent No.1/ Plaintiff for permanent injunction was decreed in her favour by judgment dated 05.02.2016 but the First Appellate Court set aside the same and allowed the appeal suit filed by the appellants / defendants by judgment dated 11.11.2022. Consequently, second appeal was preferred before High Court, in which, without formulating the substantial questions of law, the High Court granted the interim relief in the form of status quo to be maintained by the parties, and the same was in question before the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court noted that right of filing a second appeal is provided under section 100 CPC which confers jurisdiction on the High Court only when it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. In this context, Court referred its previous judgments in the matter of: (i) Ram Phal, Ram Phal v. Banarasi, (2003) 11 SCC 762; (ii) Raghavendra Swamy Mutt v. Uttaradi Mutt, (2016) 11 SCC 235; (iii) Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179; (iv) Roop Singh v. Ram Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 708; (v) SBI v. S.N. Goyal, (2008) 8 SCC 92; (vi) Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab SEB, (2010) 13 SCC 21 (vii) Umerkhan v. Bismillabi, (2011) 9 SCC 684 (viii) Bhagyashree Anant Gaonkar v. Narendra @ Nagesh Bharma Holkar, (2023) SCC Online 1236 (ix) Hemavathi & others v. V.Hombegowda and another,  2023 INSC 848 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1206 (x) Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 17 : 1962 Supp (1) SCR 450 : AIR 1962 SC 527.

Supreme Court noted that as per Section 100, a High Court can proceed to hear a Second Appeal only if the case involves a substantial question of law, implying that when the appeal is taken up for admission, it must satisfy itself that a substantial question of law is involved. Thereafter, the High Court must frame such question and direct the parties to submit their arguments on such question. The scheme of the Code also enables the High Court to hear the parties on any other substantial question of law, not framed by it at the first hearing, but during the course of hearing for the reasons to be recorded. Again, if the court is not satisfied at the first hearing that the case does not involve a substantial question of law, it cannot proceed further. Once such additional question of law is framed during the course of hearing, the parties must be given opportunity to submit their arguments on the other substantial question of law(s).

Further, Supreme Court also took cognizance of the fact, that in some High Courts, there is a practice to order Notice of Motion, whereby even before an appeal is admitted, an opportunity is granted to the respondents therein to contest the case. In such a case, it is implied that the High Court is not satisfied prima facie with the case. Such dissatisfaction could be either for a reason that the case does not involve a substantial question of law or for a reason that in the facts of the case, the question of law, though substantial, would not warrant interference. In such cases, though the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 151 of CPC is generally empowered to grant interim orders to preserve the subject matter of the dispute and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, the court cannot grant any interim protection to the appellant, unless the substantial question of law is framed under Section 100 (4) or as per the Proviso. On the other hand, if the High Court is prima facie of the view that the substantial question of law involved would not require much time for disposal, the court is bound to frame the substantial question of law at the stage of admission and then order short notice.

Thus, Supreme Court reaffirmed that the law is clear that a second appeal will be maintainable before the High Court, only if it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. If no substantial question of law arises, the second appeal could not have been entertained and the same ought to have been dismissed, as the jurisdiction of the High Court itself is not yet invoked. The High Court acquires jurisdiction to deal with the second appeal on merits only when it frames a substantial question of law as required to be framed under Section 100 CPC; and it cannot grant an interim order, without framing substantial question of law.

In light of the aforesaid settled legal position, the impugned order dated 20.09.2024 of the High Court was aside by the Supreme Court.


Monday, January 20, 2025

Suicide due to loan repayment calls cannot be termed as abetment to suicide punishable under section 306 of IPC: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court, in its judgment dated 17 January 2025 (Mahendra Awase vs. State of Madhya Pradesh), held that a suicide note alleging harassment by Mahendra Awase for repeatedly seeking repayment of loan from deceased Ranjeet Singh cannot be considered as instigating the deceased to commit suicide.  

Upon perusal of call recordings, the Supreme Court observed use of repeated abusive language by Mahendra Awase while seeking loan repayment but held that the same could not establish that he instigated the commission of suicide by the deceased or that he created such circumstances that left the deceased with no other option except to commit suicide. The relevant excerpt of the transcript of call recording is as follows:

“Deceased:  Sir in the evening, in the evening, let me go at least.
Mahendra:    Let’s go. (*********) abusive language. Now let me know whether we are to go in the evening? Yes, we are to go in the evening. Bhaiya since when you are to go. When I made a phone call only then you realized that we are to go in the evening.
Deceased:  No, he has met me two times while on the way. Now, I may go to his home and only there I may convince him. What else can I do I also told him that I have nothing more. Dear I have only 30-35 thousand rupees. You may give him and get freed.
Mahendra:   What are you narrating me. From where you may give money, (*******) abusive language.  
Deceased:  Yes, Sir.  
Mahendra:   Tell him I have no concern with it.
Deceased:  You have got it and now you may return. That is all.  
Mahendra:  Listen, if you are not giving today then you may deposit Rs. 11,800/- with penalty in the office at 11:00 AM. If you cannot, I am not in your favour. If you don’t want to talk then I will tell my authority.  
Deceased:  No, No. Sir it is our duty.  
Mahendra:   You will pay money tomorrow because you had committed it.  
Deceased:  Yes, Sir.  
Mahendra:   Otherwise, I will come to the Pump. You can run up to when you can.

Mahendra:    Let's go. (****) abusive language. Now let me know whether we are to go in the evening? Yes, we are to go in the evening. Bhaiya since when you are to go. When I made a phone call only then you realized that we are to go in the evening.
Mahendra:  What are you narrating me? From where you may give money, (***) abusive language.
Mahendra:   Tell him I have no concern with it.
Mahendra:  Listen, if you are not giving today then you may deposit Rs. 11,800/- with penalty in the office at 11:00 A.M. If you cannot, I am not in your favour. If you don't want to talk then I will tell my authority.
Mahendra:   You will pay money tomorrow because you had committed it.
Mahendra:   Otherwise, I will come to the Pump. You can run up to when you can.
Mahendra:  Thereafter, I will come home. The neighbourers will hear the story. I will put banners at your house. That’s it.
Mahendra:    You have signed the file indicating that this person has obtained the loan and now is not traceable. You may come and meet me and see that some people have written. If I may get it written which will not be right. The modesty of your parents will also hurt.
Mahendra:  Then, you may make payment of money. (****) abusive language. You may return my money. That’s all. You go and arrange.

Before reaching the conclusion, the Supreme Court referred its previous judgement in the matter of Swamy Prahaladdas vs. State of M.P. and Another, [1995 Supp (3) SCC 438] wherein the Court held that the remark to the deceased that ‘go and die’ are “casual nature which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarrelling people. Nothing serious is expected to follow thereafter. The said act does not reflect the requisite 'mens rea' on the assumption that these words would be carried out in all events. …”. The court also relied upon its earlier judgments in the matter of Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707; M. Mohan vs. State, (2011) 3 SCC 626; and Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618.

The Supreme Court also observed that Section 306 IPC appears to be casually and too readily resorted to by the police. The Court while sensitising the investigation agencies remarked that while the persons involved in genuine cases where the threshold is met should not be spared, the provision should not be deployed against individuals, only to assuage the immediate feelings of the distraught family of the deceased. The conduct of the proposed accused and the deceased, their interactions and conversations preceding the unfortunate death of the deceased should be approached from a practical point of view and not divorced from day-to-day realities of life. Hyperboles employed in exchanges should not, without anything more, be glorified as an instigation to commit suicide. It further advised trial courts to exercise great caution and circumspection and advised to not adopt a play it safe syndrome by mechanically framing charges, even if the investigating agencies in a given case have shown utter disregard for the ingredients of section 306.  

The Court finally held that the case against Mahendra Awase is groundless for framing of a charge under section 306 IPC and the order of Madhya Pradesh High Court dated 25.07.2023 was set aside and Mahendra Awase was discharged.  





While dealing with second appeal filed under Order XLI r/w Section 100 CPC, High Court cannot grant ad interim order without framing substantial question of law: Supreme Court

Supreme Court passed judgment on 17.01.2025 in the matter of U. Sudheera & Others vs. C. Yashoda & Others to reaffirm that judicial ...